Ellen A. Skinner and Melanie J. Zimmer-Gembeck e controllability of stress appears to be information that may be processed at an automatic and a conscious level and serves to shape and organize the ways that individuals mobilize their responses. However, changes in the nature of perceptions of control and the ways in which the objective and perceived controllability shape coping responses across development is not known and is an important agenda for future research. (Compas, 2009 , p. 96) Fifty years of research have documented the crucial role played by control, both objective and subjective, when people are faced with challenges and diffi culties (Bandura, 1997 ; Dweck, 1999 ; Folkman, 1984 ; Lefcourt, 1992 ; Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993 ; Seligman, 1975 ; Skinner, 1995 ; Taylor & Stanton, 2007 ; Weiner, 1986 ) . For example, degree of objective controllability is considered a defi ning characteristic of negative life events, with loss of control one of the few events that researchers acknowledge as universally stressful (Miller, 1979 ; ompson, 1981 ) . Even more extensively studied, however, is perceived or subjective control, one of the most powerful personal resources that can be called upon in dealing with obstacles or failures (Folkman, 1984 ; Taylor, 2007 ) . Its salutary eff ects have been demonstrated across domains and age groups from earliest infancy (Watson, 1966 ) to oldest age (Baltes & Baltes, 1986 ) . Multiple programs of research have traced the many pathways by which a sense of control infl uences reactions to stress, including through physiology, behavior, emotions, energy, attention, motivation, volition, and cognition. e vast majority of research has focused on individual diff erences, examining how people who experience diff ering levels of objective or perceived control behave diff erently during stressful encounters. is focus meshes well with the majority of research on coping, which also examines individual diff erences: how people who possess diff erent levels of personal and social resources (e.g., perceived control or social support) show diff erent kinds of coping, and how diff erent kinds of coping contribute to aspects of individual physical, psychological, and social functioning (Aldwin, 2007 ; Compas et al., 2001 ; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004 ) . Many fewer studies have considered the development of either control or coping, at least partly because the work on individual diff erences seems so unequivocal: e benefi ts of perceived control when dealing with stress are found at all ages. However, at a general level, researchers also agree that every aspect of how individuals detect and respond to stress is shaped by their developmental level (Aldwin, 2007 ; Compas, 1998 ; Garmezy & Rutter, 1983 ; Murphy & Moriarity, 1976 ; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007 ) . For example, infants, children, adolescents, adults, and the elderly diff er in the kinds of encounters they experience as stressful, in the nature of their appraisals, in their repertoires of potential coping responses, and in the role played by social partners. All these processes should show age-graded shifts, at least up until early adulthood, and potentially across the lifespan (Aldwin, 2007 ) . At the same time, however, researchers have noted the diffi culty of realizing a developmental agenda for the study of coping (Compas, 1998 (Compas, , 2009 Coping Consortium, 1998 Fields & Prinz, 1997 ; Skinner & Edge, 1998 ; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007 , precisely because coping refl ects a higher-order construct, integrating work on a variety of processes involved in detecting and responding to challenges, threats, and losses. e goal of this chapter is to use research on the development of perceived control to serve as a scaffold for work on the development of coping. Although most studies of control, like most studies of coping, have focused on individual diff erences, pockets of research have examined age-graded shifts in many of the processes used for perceiving and interpreting control experiences (e.g., Flammer, 1995 ; Gurin & Brim, 1984 ; Heckhausen, 1982 Heckhausen, , 1984 Skinner & Connell, 1986 ; Skinner, ZimmerGembeck, & Connell, 1998 ; Wang & Pomerantz, 2009 ; Weisz, 1980 Weisz, , 1986 Wigfi eld et al., 2006 ; . Taken together, they suggest fundamental and systematic shifts at many ages, for example, in the kinds of information used to infer control, in the strategies used to exert control, in the understanding of the causes of control (e.g., eff ort, task diffi culty, luck, ability), and even in the nature of the self to which control is attributed (Flammer, 1995 ; Skinner, 1995 ; Weisz, 1986 ) . Hence, a careful consideration of developmental shifts in control, which is a reliably robust contributor to coping, might help map out some key developmental landmarks in coping processes.
is chapter is organized in four sections. After providing an overview of current multi-level systems conceptualizations of coping and a brief summary of the nature and terminology of control, we use the research on the development of control to explore three issues: (1) how mastery-oriented and helpless ways of coping may change in their form across infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age; (2) how the development of perceived control may contribute to qualitative shifts in how coping is organized as people age; and (3) how coping itself may constitute a proximal process that shapes the development of perceived control. Running throughout the chapter is a strong emphasis on the role of social partners, relationships, and contexts in shaping both coping and perceived control.
Multi-level Systems Views of Coping
At the core of the study of coping are the ways that people actually react to and deal with real stressors in their daily lives. As a result, the building blocks of the area are "ways of coping," including constructive responses, such as problem-solving, eff ort exertion, help-seeking, distraction, or accommodation, as well as maladaptive responses, such as helplessness, escape, opposition, social isolation, or rumination. A focus on actual stressful interactions means that the study of coping has the potential to add value to work on risk and resilience by investigating how overarching risk factors may (or may not) produce daily encounters with stress, and how individuals' everyday dealings with stress may (or may not) contribute cumulatively to lasting resources and vulnerabilities (Coping Consortium, 1998 . Moreover, because coping entails a repertoire of responses, its study has the potential to integrate research across a range of individual responses to 1 stress, such as help-seeking or rumination, which typically have been studied in relative isolation from each other (Coping Consortium, 1998 . Although ways of coping are a defi ning feature of research in the area, systems conceptualizations point out that these ways, even though expressed by individuals, are actually a function of the entire transactional "coping system" in which the individual is embedded. A schematic of the coping system can be seen in the middle portion of Figure 3 .1 .
is system includes many interacting components, such as the nature of the stressor itself (e.g., its actual severity and controllability), the context in which the encounter takes place, the appraisal of what is at stake, and the personal and social resources available to the individual when dealing with the event (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984 ) . In addition, coping episodes unfold over time, so previous encounters and ongoing iterations infl uence how people deal with both novel and recurrent stressors (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985 ) .
At the same time, as also depicted in Figure 3 .1 , coping can be considered part of a multi-level process that extends from conditions of risk and resilience at the highest level to individual momentto-moment transactions with stressors at the lowest level (Coping Consortium, 1998 . As shown in the top portion of Figure 3 .1 , coping can be viewed as an adaptive process that potentially mediates the eff ects of risk or adversity on the development of competence. So within the larger frame of work on risk and resilience, coping can be considered a "proximal process" or driver of development under conditions of adversity (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998 ) . At the same time, as shown in the bottom portion of Figure 3 .1 , coping episodes can be decomposed into individual stressful encounters that take place in real time and are shaped by the actions of particular social partners as well as by the subsystems that give rise to specifi c individual reactions, such as physiology, emotion, attention, cognition, motivation, and behavior. At this level, coping overlaps with work on regulation, especially the study of regulation under stressful conditions (Compas, 2009 ; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Guthrie, 1997 ; Eisenberg, Valiente, & Sulik, 2009 ; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2009 ).
Such a multi-level view has been used by theorists to describe the place and purpose of research on coping with respect to work on resilience (which takes place at a higher level) and work on regulation (which takes place at a lower level) (Skinner, 1999 ) . Researchers point out the requirements that such a task places on conceptualizations of coping, but also highlight the potential of coping to contribute to the integration of a range of theories, methodologies, and fi ndings relevant to understanding how individual development is shaped by stress and adversity, work that currently inhabits a variety of niches distributed across all of psychology (Coping Consortium, 1998 ).
Nature of Control and Control Constructs
In attempting to use research on the development of control to inform work on coping, it is important to be clear about the nature and functioning of control. Because the area of control is so fertile, it has supported research on a variety of constructs, including locus of control (Lefcourt, 1992 ; Rotter, 1966 ; Strickland, 1989 ) , expectancies of success (Wigfi eld & Eccles, 2000 ) , causal attributions (Weiner, 2005 ) , learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975 ) , self-effi cacy (Bandura, 1997 ) , mastery (Dweck, 1999 ) , and perceived competence (Harter, 2006 ) . (See Heckhausen, 1991 ; Stipek, 2002 ; or Wigfi eld et al., 2006 , for more details.) On the one hand, the simultaneous investigation of these overlapping processes has produced a mature understanding of the antecedents, consequences, and mechanisms of control across multiple domains and age groups. On the other hand, the profusion of constructs has made it diffi cult to judge the validity of competing claims or even to discern the boundaries of the fi eld of control itself (Skinner, 1996 ) .
e nature of control
Although consensus is not complete, a generally accepted assumption in the area is that the power of control to organize human behavior is based on the fact that all people (and many other species) come with a fundamental psychological need to be eff ective in their interactions with the environment (Connell & Wellborn, 1990; Deci & Ryan, 1985 ; Elliot & Dweck, 2005 ; Elliot, McGregor, & rash, 2002 ; Harter, 1978 ; Koestner & McClelland, 1990 ; Skinner, 1985) . Referred to as the need for eff ectance, competence, or control, this idea was fi rst articulated in the psychological literature in 1959 by Robert White, who assembled a wide range of observations and research sug gesting humans possess an intrinsic desire to create eff ects in the environment, apparent, for example, in infants' delight in making things rattle and fall. White's insight -that this motive off ers an adaptive edge because people are naturally motivated to discover how the world works and how their actions can be eff ective -has proven durable. Successive generations of researchers have shown how species-wide human neurophysiology supports this motivation, providing energy and eff ort focused on producing desired and preventing undesired outcomes, and leading to joy upon creating eff ects and dejection at non-contingency and loss of control (e.g., Amat et al., 2007 ; Gunnar & Quevado, 2007 ; Watson & Ramey, 1972 ) .
Terminology of control
Hence, at the core of control is the experience of exerting eff ort that produces a desired outcome (Skinner, 1996 ) . Also referred to as generative transmission or personal force , these experiences of control or mastery can be distinguished from objective and subjective control. depicted by the objective contingencies in the environment (the conditional probability of an outcome given action compared to the probability of an outcome given no action) and the actual competencies of the actor (Seligman, 1977) . Careful experimental studies of objective non-contingency have been able to uncover the neurological and hormonal pathways by which it shapes stress responses, and have shown that its deleterious eff ects can be found across a range of mammalian species (Maier & Watkins, 2005 ) . Subjective control refers to perceived control or the actor's estimations of the control available to him or her. Most theories in the area are focused on perceived control, and so their names refer to facets of subjective control: an overall sense of control (e.g., expectancies of success, control beliefs), beliefs about available contingencies (e.g., locus of control, causal attributions, learned helplessness, strategy beliefs), or beliefs about one's access to eff ective means (e.g., self-effi cacy, perceived competence, perceived ability, capacity beliefs). In discussions of whether more control is better, these diff erent kinds of control are often confused. Mastery experiences have consistently been found to result in a range of physiological and psychological benefi ts. However, although objective control and subjective control usually produce positive eff ects, they do not always. For example, sometimes the availability of control can prove to be coercive -pressuring people to exert eff ort or to engage with stressors when they might prefer not to.
Individual Diff erences in Control and Coping
All three kinds of control, that is, objective, subjective, and experiences of control -shape coping (Folkman, 1984 ) . Objective controllability is a defi ning feature of the stressors to which individuals are exposed (Seligman, 1975 ) . When examining coping, researchers are usually careful to distinguish situations that are objectively uncontrollable from those that are open to infl uence (Compas et al., 1991 ) . Controllability matters, whether the event is relatively trivial and short-lived (e.g., going to the dentist or giving a report in front of the class) or more chronic and potentially life-changing (e.g., parents' divorce or life-threatening illness). In fact, a key difference between stressors appraised as challenge, threat, or loss is the degree of controllability, with loss events by defi nition off ering no possibility of reversing the outcome (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984 ) .
Subjective control describes an important personal resource individuals draw upon in forming appraisals and planning actions (Dweck, 1999 ; Folkman, 1984 ) . It is the conduit by which objective control conditions shape coping (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978 ) . In contrast to objective and subjective control, experiences of control describe the coping process itself: Mastery refers to coping episodes in which problem-solving eff orts are deployed, and in which, over time, desired outcomes are produced and undesired ones are prevented or terminated. In the same vein, helplessness describes coping experiences in which attempts to infl uence the outcome do not produce their desired eff ects.
Control and the dynamics of coping
e eff ects of control are apparent at every point in the coping process (Dweck, 1999 ; Folkman, 1984 ; Skinner, 1995 ; Wigfi eld et al., 2006 ) . When events are objectively controllable or when individuals have high confi dence and effi cacy, they are more likely to expect to be eff ective in stressful situations and so to appraise negative events as challenges rather than threats.
ey approach tasks with concentration and vigor, break them into manageable sequential parts, and employ a variety of alternative strategies. ey look for action opportunities as events unfold, and remain focused on problem solutions. ey maintain access to their cognitive resources and so perform close to the ceiling of their capacity. ey show fl exible and creative problemsolving, and seek help when needed. Regulation is constructive -that is, focused on generating strategies and shaping actions to be eff ective. ey collect information about potential contingencies, viewing even failed attempts as instructive. ey show more planning and proactive coping, taking preemptive actions. is pattern of coping is likely to be successful in actually dealing with stressful situations, and even when problems are not immediately solvable, produces gains in knowledge and skills. Over time, these coping episodes augment actual competence and may even reduce the likelihood of subsequent encounters with stressful events, both of which in the long run bolster a sense of control (e.g., Schmitz & Skinner, 1993 ) .
Processes of helplessness have also been studied in detail (Dweck, 1999 ; Peterson et al., 1993 ) . People who are exposed to uncontrollable events, who feel incompetent, or who believe that events are contingent on unknown or uncontrollable causes (like powerful others, chance, luck, or fate) seem to ey appraise events as more threatening and tend to procrastinate or give up quickly. ey lose focus and concentration, becoming distracted by selfdoubt, rumination about failure, and worries about lack of ability. ese preoccupations rob them of their previous skills at hypothesis-testing and strategizing (Dweck, 1999 ) , resulting in more rigid problem-solving, passivity, confusion, escape, or help avoidance. is pattern of coping is not eff ective in dealing with stressors or learning from mistakes, and interferes with the development of actual skills and competencies, even making future stressors more likely (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998 ) . In the long run, such experiences cement pessimism and expectations of future helplessness (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksma, Girgus, & Seligman, 1986 ) .
As can be seen, these dynamics are amplifying. Individuals who are initially high on perceived control, through the ways they engage with problems, become even more competent and effi cacious, whereas individuals who initially doubt their capacity to infl uence events, through their ineff ectual handling of challenges, become even less competent and more helpless. Such cycles, if they iterate over time, can magnify initial individual diff erences, making the rich richer and the poor even poorer, and transforming subjective control to objective control. Taken together with information about objective control conditions (actual stressors and diffi culties) and social supports, these dynamics can provide one account of the development of individual diff erences in perceived control, competence, and patterns of coping with stress (Seligman, 1975 ; .
Developmental Conceptualizations of Coping
It has proven surprisingly diffi cult to move beyond research on individual diff erences in coping in order to focus on the study of its development. A developmental agenda calls for research that identifi es agegraded shifts in how infants, children, youth, adults, and the elderly detect, appraise, and respond to actual stressful events in their everyday lives, and would depict the underlying developments responsible for these changes (Compas, 1998 (Compas, , 2009 Murphy & Moriarity, 1976 ; Skinner & Edge, 1998 ; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007 ) . In making progress on this agenda, researchers have had to construct "developmentally friendly" conceptualizations that link coping to basic adaptive processes. An important step in this regard has been consensus that coping can be considered "regulation under stress" (Compas et al., 2001 ; Eisenberg et al., 1997 Eisenberg et al., , 2009 Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007 ) . From this perspective, coping refers to how people mobilize, coordinate, manage, and direct their actions (including behavior, emotion, attention, cognition, and physiology) under conditions of challenge, threat, or loss.
is defi nition establishes links between coping and the normative development of emotional, attentional, and behavioral regulation as well as the underlying constitutional and social factors that shape their development.
A second important step has been the use of overarching families to help organize the seemingly endless lists of ways of coping that have been studied to date (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003 ) . It has proven impossible to integrate studies of coping across (or even within) age groups because assessments utilize a wide variety of disparate and partially overlapping categories of coping (Compas et al., 2001 ; Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2009 ). Analyses of their multiple functions allow ways of coping to be classifi ed into about a dozen families that serve three major adaptive functions (Table 3.1 ) .
e major adaptive function of the ways of coping organized around control is to fi nd actions that are eff ective in operating contingencies in the environment. e four families that serve this function are: (1) problem-solving , which allows people to generate and adjust their actions so that they are eff ective; (2) information-seeking , which allows people to discover new contingencies in the environment; (3) helpless ness , which identifi es the limits of eff ective action; and (4) escape, which is an extreme form of avoidance that allows people to leave, distance themselves from, or deny non-contingent environments.
Each of these families contains many ways of coping in addition to the one used as its label. For example, "problem-solving" includes all ways of coping that serve the function of adjusting actions to be more eff ective, such as eff ort exertion, persistence, instrumental action, strategizing, planning, active attempts, and so on. Likewise, "informationseeking" includes many ways of collecting knowledge about how to produce desired and prevent undesired events, including asking others, looking up information in reference sources, direct observation of others' performances, reading, experimentation, and so on. ese four families of coping have been the subject of intense scrutiny: Within research on coping, they are some of the most common ways  ,  
Family Function in Adaptive Process
Flexibly adjust preferences to options 1 studied and some of the most common reactions to stress (Skinner et al., 2003 ) . Within the area of control, they are the operational defi nitions of mastery and helplessness. ese families represent complete overlap between the areas of coping and control and so are the primary ways of coping considered in this chapter.
Perceived Control and the Development of Ways of Coping
e fi rst way that research on perceived control may be able to contribute to developmental studies of coping is to reveal how mastery-oriented and helpless ways of coping change in their form across infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age. e analysis of overarching functions of coping families marks the beginning of such a catalog. Functions can be used to identify corresponding lower-order ways of coping that, despite their apparent topological diff erences, are developmentally graded members of the same family. Functional analyses have been used in work on emotion and attachment to show that a variety of forms of action (such as crying, calling, and crawling to a caregiver) fall within the same category because they serve the same function (in this case, proximity-seeking) (Cassidy, 1994 ; Cassidy & Shaver, 1999 ) .
e identifi cation of functionally analo gous categories allows a phenomenon to be followed across developmental periods even if it changes its form. A consideration of the action outcomes of perceived control at successive ages may be helpful in identifying functionally analogous ways of coping for the families of problem-solving, informationseeking, helplessness, and escape.
Perceived control and coping during infancy
Newborns react to stressors based on their species' general stress physiology and their temperamental characteristics (Derryberry et al., 2003 ; Gunnar & Quevado, 2007 ) . Generally, infants come with the capacity to detect action-outcome contingencies and to respond to them with interest and energy (Papousek & Papousek, 1979 ; Watson, 1966 ) . At the same time, there also seem to be inborn individual diff erences in sensitivity to contingencies, interest in creating eff ects, focus of attention, and intensity of emotional responsiveness to contingent stimulation. Studied individually as dimensions of temperament or collectively as mastery motivation (Morgan & Harmon, 1984) , such diff erences have been documented in the fi rst months of life (Rueda & Rothbart, 2009 ).
Critical to understanding perceived control in infancy is the recognition that the earliest experiences of control are created by caregivers when they show sensitive responsiveness to infants' signals (Davidov & Grusec, 2006 ; Lamb & Easterbrooks, 1981 ; Landry, Smith, & Swank, 2006 ; Papousek & Papousek, 1980 ) . Social partners can provide contingency long before infants have the motor coordination to create eff ects in the physical world. Control experiences (and early coping) for infants consist of sending out distress signals, and gaining confi dence that caregivers will soon respond with appropriate comforting actions. e same experiences that promote a sense of control also promote a secure attachment, and such attachments have been shown to buff er stress and shape the development of stress reactions, including physiological ones, starting at birth (Nachmias, Gunnar, Mangelsdorf, Parritz, & Buss, 1996 ) . e earliest forms of stress reactions are based on refl exes and temperament, but they are soon supplemented by action schemes, such as directing bids or shaping the distress signals sent to caregivers (Barrett & Campos, 1991 ; Kopp, 1989 ) . If caregiver reactions are not forthcoming, eff orts are normally intensifi ed (Goldstein, Bornstein, & Schwade, 2009 ) . In terms of creating contingencies in the physical world, early object play involves repetition and "practice" creating desired eff ects, such as shaking rattles or hitting dangling toys (Piaget, 1976 ) . Early forms of information-seeking may include social referencing, in which infants study their caregivers for signs communicating the severity and emotional signifi cance of novel or stressful events (Diamond & Aspinwall, 2003 ; Hornik, Risenhoover, & Gunnar, 1987 ; Lewis & Ramsay, 1999 ; Sorce et al., 1985 ) . Infants use this information to guide their actions, deciding, for example, whether to continue into a potentially dangerous situation or to scoot back to the caregiver. Other early forms of information-seeking may include object play, in which the various potentials of an object are explored, and "learning by doing," in which infants successively try out multiple variants on an action, such as banging a spoon with varying amounts of force (Piaget, 1976 ) . e earliest forms of helplessness usually involve passivity in the face of objectively controllable events, and may also involve protest and other forms of emotional distress (Watson & Ramey, 1972 ) . When infants are passive, they create fewer actionevent contingencies. Moreover, learned helplessness implies that they also pay less attention to eff ects  ,  1 that are created, and so are less sensitive to detecting existing contingencies. In terms of escape, its prototypical expression involves leaving the stressful situation, and so is most obvious after an infant can loco mote. Nevertheless, prior to independent loco motion, infants can express the desire to escape by reaching for the caregiver (Robinson & Acevedo, 2001 ) or leaning/looking away from an event (Gianino & Tronick, 1988 ) . ey may also escape through gaze aversion, head turning, or sleep (Kopp, 1989 ; Kopp & Neufeld, 2003 ; Mangelsdorf, Shapiro, & Marzolf, 1995 ) .
Perceived control and coping during preschool age
Ages 2 to 5 bring a major shift in children's action potential. For the fi rst time, they become able to intentionally direct their own behaviors, stopping themselves from doing things they spontaneously want to do and making themselves do things they do not really want to (Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2005 ) . is expands their repertoire of eff ective actions and allows them to be more self-reliant in producing desired eff ects. Temperament continues to play a role, with children higher in emotional reactivity less able to regulate and children higher in eff ortful control more able to regulate their behaviors of their own accord (Kochanska, Aksan, & Carlson, 2005 ) . Information-seeking can also become more intentional. Preschool-age children can pose explicit requests to adults and peers, asking for information about what to do when faced with obstacles and diffi culties (Kerns et al., 2006 ) .
Young children still rely on caregivers and adults in stressful situations, but with enough support they are often able to carry out eff ective actions on their own (Bronson, 2000 ) . At the same time, however, the severity of the stressful event and the quality of adult participation determine whether children will be able to act eff ectively in a given situation (Kopp, 2009 ) . Joint problem-solving with caring adults likely represents the kind of coping episodes out of which a repertoire of adaptive strategies, as well as confi dence and actual competence, emerges (Kopp, 2009 ) .
At this age, helplessness and escape take on their prototypical forms (Burhans & Dweck, 1995 ) . Compared to mastery-oriented children, young children with low perceived control show less persistence, focus, and concentration on diffi cult tasks, and try out less sophisticated hypothesis-testing strategies. In terms of escape, they stop working as soon as possible and select easier future tasks. Although there was initially some speculation that young children might be less vulnerable to helplessness than older children, subsequent research has demonstrated that preschool-age children, given appropriate tasks and concrete evidence of failure, show full-blown helplessness eff ects, including behavioral, emotional, and self-derogatory components (e.g., Boggiano et al., 1993 ) .
It is important to note that the development of coping strategies seems to be cumulative (ZimmerGembeck & Skinner, 2009 ) -that is, there is no evidence that, as new ways of coping emerge, old strategies disappear. For example, as young children become able to intentionally deploy actions and explicitly request information, they nevertheless continue to have access to action schema that served them as infants, such as direct action, eff ort exertion, expressions of distress, direct observation of others, and social referencing. In this way, coping repertoires are expanded and may become more organized and integrated, although few studies of coping have empirically examined this possibility (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2009 ).
Perceived control and coping during childhood
A major shift taking place between ages 5 and 7 is the development of problem-solving that is largely cognitive in nature (Sameroff & Haith, 1996 ) -that is, children are better able to imagine the eff ects of diff erent strategies, and then select the one they think is most likely to be eff ective, without needing to actually try them out on the plane of action (Piaget, 1976 ) .
is expands coping possibilities, saving children a great deal of time and energy, by bringing strategies forward from previous episodes and by avoiding potential failures and negative social reactions. Children are also increasingly able to use cognitive means of information-seeking, for example reading, even though social means of information-seeking are still preferred, including going to adults for advice and, for specifi c issues, turning to peers (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2008 ). e use of cognition to organize coping responses opens the way for adaptive strategies, but it can also play a role in the creation of helplessness. During middle childhood, children's cognitive expectancies become important and stubborn drivers of action (Dweck, 1999 ) . If children believe they have little or no control (Carpenter, 1992 ) or are given less objective control over a stressor (Manne et al., 1992 ) , they manage stressful events less competently (see Miller et al., 1999 , for a review). As a result, children's cognitions interfere with the production of evidence that would disconfi rm their expectations of helplessness. Escape can also take cognitive forms. In addition to physically escaping situations in which they do not expect to succeed, children increasingly escape via cognitive means, such as daydreaming or withdrawal of mental eff ort (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2009 ) . ese forms of escape may be less disruptive than physical attempts to leave (in the classroom, for example), but they are also harder to detect, which means that they can impede teachers' and other adults' attempts to remedy them.
Perceived control and coping during adolescence
A major shift during adolescence is the potential for youth to use meta-cognitive strategies when dealing with challenges and failures (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006 ; see Compas et al., 2001 , for a review). Metacognition, or the capacity to refl ect on one's own cognitive processes, emotions, and actions, provides at least two advantages to coping. First, it allows a teenager to use information about the long-term eff ects of a course of action in making local decisions about which strategy to use in solving a problem. e capacity to imagine future emotional and social consequences of an action extends the potential eff ectiveness of coping beyond the current episode (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997 ) . Second, metacognition allows adolescents to coordinate multiple perspectives and alternative pathways in deciding how to deal with a challenge or setback. ey can comfort themselves using largely cognitive meanssuch as telling themselves that a depressed mood is only temporary -and can coordinate their own wishes and desires with those of others in their problem-solving (e.g., Band & Weisz, 1990 ) . Although representations of attachment fi gures play a role in stress reactions beginning in infancy (Lewis & Ramsay, 1999 ; Nachmias et al., 1996 ; Urban, Carlson, Egeland, & Sroufe, 1991 ) , adolescents have the potential to construct even more advanced and coherent representations of others as available and secure sources of comfort and aid. Hence, adolescents' cognitive representations can serve as stronger and more durable sources of support when others are not physically present, alleviating distress and allowing adolescents to better focus their coping actions (Seiff ge-Krenke, 2004 ; Shaver, Belsky, & Brennan, 2000 ) . Consistent with growth in meta-cognitive strategies, adolescents experience other cognitive advances that expand their capacity to manage daily stressors and major life events. ese include abstract rather than concrete representations, improvements in working memory capacity, the ability to engage in multidimensional thinking, and a greater capacity for self-refl ection (Keating, 1999 ) . Moreover, based on practical experiences, adolescents also gain knowledge in a range of content areas, including knowledge about stressful events, controllability, and coping, which assists them to automatize their responses or to more easily recognize the most salient cues and draw upon their knowledge of relevant and useful responses. By having the background knowledge and the capacity to think about multiple dimensions and self-refl ect, adolescents often show signs of broader conceptual reorganizations (Case, 1985 ; Case, Hayward, Lewis, & Hurst, 1988 ) , and they are more likely to use their new abilities to adopt the perspectives of others, to negotiate and accommodate, and to consider multiple solutions to their problems (Seiff ge-Krenke, 2004 ).
e use of meta-cognitive strategies and other advances in thinking can have drawbacks, too. e same skills that permit adolescents to imagine longterm consequences and think about multiple aspects of phenomena also permit them to worry about the future and imagine negative outcomes and failures.
ey are more likely than children to ruminate and worry excessively (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2008 ) . e inferential power of adolescents also allows them to become stuck within a mindset of helplessness (Dweck, 2002 ) . Once an adolescent views himself or herself as incompetent, even multiple experiences of success can be discounted using inferential tactics -deciding that high performance is due to luck, easy tasks, or the favor of powerful others. e capacity to take multiple perspectives can also be deployed to evade detection when escaping, whether that be via actual physical escape (like skipping school) or procrastination (like delaying household chores). Adolescents also have greater access to and participate in some potentially detrimental escape coping behaviors, such as binge drinking, other drug use, or risky sexual behavior, and they report that they do so in order to cope with stress (Frydenberg & Lewis, 2000 ) .
Perceived control and coping during adulthood
Compared with childhood and adolescence, agegraded shifts in the means of exerting control are not as well documented during adulthood (Baltes & Baltes, 1986 ; Lachman & Prenda-Firth, 2004 ;   ,  Wolinsky et al., 2003 ; Zarit, Pearlin, & Schaie, 2003 ) . However, it is assumed that as adults develop domain-specifi c expertise, they will be more eff ective in problem-solving and strategizing. One possible new skill is the capacity to integrate and prioritize competing demands (Deci & Ryan, 1985 ) . is would allow people to recognize situations in which diff erent facets of themselves are pulling for diff erent strategies, and to use their genuine priorities to sort out the right course of action for themselves to use in dealing with challenges or failures.
is might help explain individuals' increasing capacity to decline to employ the most eff ective strategy for producing a given outcome, if the strategy has negative side eff ects, for example, if it violates their own moral code or infl icts harm on someone else (Deci & Ryan, 1985 .
During adulthood and old age, changes in how control is exerted seem to be less a function of age and more a function of social structure and the nature of events that are encountered (Aldwin, Sutton, Chiara, & Spiro, 1996 ; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1998 ; Zarit et al., 2003 ) . So, for example, social and biological timelines seem to shape individuals' control eff orts, with increased activity immediately prior to a developmental deadline (such as childbearing age) and activities focused on devaluing the outcome once the deadline has passed (Schulz, Wrosch, & Heckhausen, 2003 ) . Despite researchers' assumptions that biological and cognitive declines in old age should result in more helplessness and maladaptive coping, empirical evidence contradicts this idea, leading researchers to focus on the capacities of the elderly to deal with objective losses without falling into helplessness (Aldwin, 2007 ) . Moreover, although so far no evidence suggests that it is age-graded, the emergence of wisdom and spiritual developments during adulthood and old age would be likely to reorganize people's coping strategies (Baltes & Staudinger, 1995 ) , including problem-solving and information-seeking, as well as potentially reducing helplessness and the desire for escape.
Summary of developmentally graded ways of coping organized around control
Development decisively constrains the expression of the four families of coping organized around adjusting actions to be eff ective in producing desired outcomes. e limited repertoire of infants involves refl exes, temperamental preferences, and action schema. However, if infants have responsive caregivers, their joint coping repertoire is expanded greatly.
Infants learn in the fi rst days of life whether their expressed desires create changes in the world. is discovery, the origins of a sense of control, can provide motivation for eff orts to deploy increasingly more diff erentiated and appropriate signals when distressed (Holodynski & Friedlmeier, 2006 ) . Such experiences actually reduce reactivity in stress physiology and prepare the infant to be more curious and active in subsequent interactions with the social and physical world.
Consistent with research on regulation, research on control suggests that general mechanisms of coping accumulate developmentally, for example, adding regulation via action schemes during infancy, supplemented by coping through direct action during preschool age, coping using cognitive means during middle childhood, and coping using metacognitive means during adolescence (Table 3. 2 ; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007 ) . Perhaps these means of coping continue to be integrated and elaborated during adulthood, becoming more selective and fl exible, at the same time that the development of domain-specifi c expertise enriches coping capacity in selected areas.
e entire repertoire will be needed to deal adaptively with the normative challenges of aging (Aldwin, 2007 ) .
ese developmental phases are accompanied by diff erent kinds of participation by social partners. During infancy, caregivers carry out coping actions based on the expressed intentions of their infants. During toddlerhood and preschool age, children directly enlist the participation of social partners. During middle childhood, children are increasingly able to coordinate their coping eff orts with those of others, consulting both peers and adults. By adolescence, social partners are a backup system, with much of their functioning expressed through the internalization of values and guides by the adolescent. During adulthood, individuals create their own dyadic and family-level coping systems to which they contribute and that shape their own stress reactions and coping (Berg et al., 1998 ) . During later life, the loss of social partners and roles requires signifi cant adjustment to maintain highquality coping, and constructive help from social partners (e.g., an aging spouse, siblings, or adult children) is an important interpersonal resource for coping (Aldwin et al., 2009; Zarit et al., 2003 ) .
roughout the lifespan, reliance on others when dealing with stressful life events is both normative and adaptive (Newman, 2000 ) . In fact, learning to "cope well with others" is an important developmental task at every age (Berg et al., 1998 ) . 
Development of Perceived Control and Age-Graded Shifts in Coping
e second way that work on perceived control may be able guide the developmental study of coping is to use research on age changes in the processes of perceiving and interpreting control experiences to identify developmental periods marked by qualitative changes, and to explore whether they correspond to landmark shifts in processes of coping. In examining the development of perceived control, researchers fi nd it useful to organize the variety of constructs populating the area according to the functions they serve in an action sequence, such as a coping transaction (Heckhausen, 1991 ; Skinner, 1995 ) . Beliefs that come into play prior to the initiation of action can be thought of as regulatory beliefs; beliefs that make sense of action sequences after they have occurred can be referred to as interpretative beliefs. Regulatory beliefs launch and guide coping; they shape whether and how people approach and engage in a stressful transaction. e beliefs that regulate action are control beliefs or the sense that "I can do it." Variously labeled as perceived control, sense of control, expectancies of success, and self-effi cacy, these constructs refer to generalized expectations that the self can produce desired and prevent undesired outcomes.
After performance outcomes, individuals employ interpretative beliefs to translate the causal meaning of the action episode. ese include people's explanations about the likely causes of desired and undesired events (also called strategy beliefs), as well as people's explanations about their own role in producing success or failure (also known as capacity beliefs). Strategy beliefs refer to generalized expectancies about the eff ectiveness of certain causes (such as eff ort, ability, powerful others, luck, and unknown); they are similar to locus of control, causal attributions, explanatory style, or responseoutcome expectancies. Capacity beliefs refer to generalized expectancies about the extent to which the self possesses or has access to potentially eff ective causes; they are similar to self-effi cacy, perceived competence, or perceived ability (Connell, 1985 ; Skinner, 1995 Skinner, , 1996 Weisz, 1986 ) . Both strategy and capacity beliefs are important in interpreting the meaning of a causal episode. For example, individuals may believe that eff ort is a good strategy for success, but doubt that they have the personal capacity to exert eff ort. Unknown strategy beliefs, or the conviction that one has no idea how to succeed, are some of the most pernicious and maladaptive beliefs people can hold and, developmentally, some of the earliest predictors of helplessness (Connell, 1985 ) .
Profi les of control
Patterns of perceived control can be identifi ed that are powerful predictors of motivation, performance, and coping. Optimal profi les include high control expectancies, high beliefs in eff ort as a strategy, and high confi dence in one's own capacities, combined with low dependence on uncontrollable strategies In contrast, the most maladaptive profi le incorporates a low generalized sense of control, low beliefs in eff ort as an eff ective strategy, and low confidence in one's own capacities, combined with high reliance on uncontrollable strategies. Aggregate scores created to refl ect these profi les in the academic domain are strong predictors of engagement, achievement, and eventually retention or dropout, all the way from elementary to high school (e.g., Connell et al., 1994 Connell et al., , 1996 .
Developmental course of perceived control
Distinguishing among these diff erent kinds of beliefs has been important for research on development because diff erent aspects of perceived control show diff erent patterns of age-graded change 1 (Skinner et al., 1988 ) . In general, young children's beliefs start out optimistic, undiff erentiated, and unrealistic, in that their outcome expectations are much higher than their actual levels of performance would warrant (Stipek et al., 1992 ) . It is as if young children have an amalgamated sense of personal force, which incorporates not only actual eff ectiveness but also the intensity of their wishes and desires. At the most general level, normative development involves successively diff erentiating other important causes from this amalgam, coming to recognize, for example, the roles played by other people, task diffi culty, luck, and ability (Weisz, 1980 (Weisz, , 1981 (Weisz, , 1986 . Children become more eff ective agents as they increasingly understand how outcomes are shaped by the interplay among multiple necessary and suffi cient causes. In this sense, normative change is a series of developments leading toward more realistic and complex causal schema as children grow older (Sedlak & Kurtz, 1981 ; Weisz, 1983 Weisz, , 1984 . At the same time, however, an increasingly realistic understanding of how to exert control comes with a potential downside. As children become more clear about the important role played by causes other than personal force, their sense of their own competence (which relies on the strength of personal force) is naturally diminished.
is general pattern can be discerned in research on the development of children's causal conceptions and perceived competence in the academic domain Weisz, 1986 ) . As causal schema develop that allow children to successively diff erentiate conceptions of eff ort from the contributions of other people, from their own desires and wishes, from task diffi culty, from luck, and from ability, a steady decline in children's sense of their own competence can be detected (Stipek & Daniels, 1988 ) , accompanied by evidence that these perceptions come to be calibrated to their actual levels of performance (e.g., Stipek, 1984) .
In integrating work on development with research on individual diff erences, the key question for control theorists becomes: How can children's generalized sense of control, which ideally would remain strong, weather the successive developments needed to produce a more realistic understanding of the complexity (and potential uncontrollability) of causes? In other words, how can children construct a successively more complex and veridical picture of causal phenomena without exerting so much downward pressure on their control expectancies that it undermines their motivation, engagement, and coping? We consider these questions briefl y for three well-documented developmental shifts that take place during early childhood, middle childhood, and early adolescence. We also speculate about some less well-studied shifts during adulthood and aging. In keeping with a multi-level developmental framework, the answers to these questions include a consideration of what the individual brings from previous developmental periods, as well as the nature of the current shift (typically based on underlying cognitive developments), and the demands and supports provided by social partners in the current context.
Diff erentiating self and other as causes of outcomes
Sometime during the second year, children come to appreciate the diff erence between the actions of the self and those of other people as causal factors in producing task outcomes (Heckhausen, 1982 (Heckhausen, , 1984 . In the parlance of control, conceptions of personal force no longer include concrete instrumental help from others. Hence, to feel effi cacious, a toddler needs to "Do it myself!" (Geppert & Kuster, 1983 ) . is development may be one factor underlying the emergence of the desire for autonomous action, which is a marked characteristic of 2-year-olds (Heckhausen, 1988 ) . In terms of coping, such a development suggests that caregivers may need to take a step back from directly carrying out coping actions for children or risk undermining their sense of control. However, despite the fact that it refl ects a cognitive advance and may contribute to gains in self-reliance, the loss of direct physical assistance from caregivers seriously limits what children are able to achieve, and so creates its own corresponding risk of helplessness. To negotiate this transition in ways that support independence and still preserve a sense of effi cacy, caregivers are required to show careful developmental attunement during coping episodes (Kliewer, Sandler, & Wolchik, 1994 ) . Caregivers can gently move to more distal forms of support, scaff olding toddlers' performance with suggestions, ideas, and encouragement. Patience is also required, as children's initial struggles take longer than caregivers' solutions, and children's frustration and discouragement may be diffi cult for caregivers to tolerate. In a sense, caregivers now move to standby alert, so they are available if children ask for direct help, to respond with a teaching attitude, suggesting to the child "I'll show you how, so you can do it yourself." e transition in modes of coping is smoother if, prior to toddlers' demands for independence, caregivers have a history of actively promoting children's skill acquisition and independent coping. is increases the likelihood that toddlers have more actual competence at their disposal when attempting to be self-reliant. Moreover, the handoff to more independent coping is facilitated by a secure attachment, based on a previous history of sensitive cooperation between caregiver and child. is results in more fl exibility on the child's part in relying on and welcoming appropriate forms of participation from caregivers. It also supports the development of a child's sense that he or she has access to powerful others during coping episodes. In contrast, when caregivers are intrusive and continue to insert themselves into children's coping episodes when help is not needed or over children's protests, children can become helpless, passive, resistant, or angry (Pomeranz & Eaton, 2000 . In a similar vein, when children try to cope by themselves with events that overwhelm them, such as often occurs with neglectful parenting, children can become discouraged, confused, or anxious. Both intrusive and neglectful parenting undermine the development of self-reliant strategies for dealing with challenges and threats, as well as interfering with a sense of control (Flammer, 1995 ; Skinner, 1995 ) .
No wonder this transition can feel like a balancing act, in which caregivers are continually gauging whether children are competent enough to handle certain tasks on their own and how to provide the minimum support necessary to allow toddlers to eventually achieve success through their own sustained eff orts (Heckhausen, 1988 ; Skinner & Edge, 1998 ) . Ensuring that the challenges toddlers face are developmentally appropriate, in turn, depends not only on whether caregivers can show the kind of authoritative parenting that sets fi rm limits on the everyday tasks toddlers are allowed to tackle, but also on whether caregivers have the higherorder resources they need to keep overwhelming stressors out of their children's lives (Tolan & Grant, 2009) .
roughout coping episodes, of critical importance are the explanations that caregivers off er children for their successes and failures (Dweck & Molden, 2005 ) . e most benefi cent attributions are ones that direct children's causal interpretations toward their eff orts and strategies, and away from their permanent characteristics and abilities. Perhaps surprisingly, even praise for positive traits, such as goodness and smartness, focuses children's attention on the causal force of immutable entities, which are by defi nition uncontrollable (Kamins & Dweck, 1999 ) . Of course, when children do not succeed and adult help is needed, caregivers can assure children that they will be successful at more diffi cult tasks by themselves when they are older and have more practice.
Social comparison, perceived control, and coping
Starting in about fi fth grade, children become more interested and able to use the performances of peers as a standard against which to measure their own levels of performance (Ruble, 1983 ) . is new skill refl ects a gain in the accuracy of control beliefs in that normative performance information allows children to distinguish task diffi culty (when everyone performs poorly) as a cause of performance outcomes. It also allows children to recognize when it is something about their own action that is contributing to performance, namely, when their own level of performance diff ers from the norm (i.e., when they perform better or worse than everyone else) (Weiner, 1986 ) . Social comparison can be seen in many domains in middle childhood, but it is most obvious in areas that are highly valued by the social context, and in which outcomes are directly compared and evaluated, such as in school, sports, physical appearance, and popularity.
Social comparison can serve useful purposes when coping. An accurate estimate of diffi culty can be used to gather the resources and allow the time needed to be eff ective. If one is performing poorly on tasks while others are succeeding, it can also be interpreted as information that one needs to apply more eff ort or try diff erent strategies. In fact, downward social comparison seems to be an important mechanism for dealing with losses during old age, performance with other people their own age, and note that they themselves are better off in comparison (e.g., Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993 ) . However, despite the fact that better estimates of task diffi culty represent a cognitive advance, they also create a potential vulnerability for coping and a sense of control. When dealing with diffi culties and setbacks, they can add the burden of self-evaluation, of "looking over one's shoulder" at how everyone else is doing. For children who are lagging behind their age-mates, it is easy to become discouraged and to denigrate their own potential. Such a mindset adds stress to already demanding situations and subtracts resources that could be used for coping. It can even be a basis for devaluing whole areas of activity, namely, those in which one is behind or in which one needs to exert much more eff ort compared to others. It is a sad irony that such decisions can steer children away from precisely those activities where more experience and practice could lead to improvement.
is transition is easier for children who have developed adequate levels of social, academic, and physical competence before social comparison comes online. Social partners, both adults and peers, can also ease the transition if they encourage children to use normative comparisons as information about task diffi culty and eff ort, but not about capacity (Dweck, 1999 ) . At the level above individual partners, social contexts communicate key messages about the centrality and meaning of performance comparisons (Elliot, 1999 ) . For example, work on achievement goals shows that explicit rankings and competition, which characterize many schools, sports teams, and peer groups, exacerbate the potential negative impact of social comparison, leading children to focus on their relatively stable attributes as causes of performance and to avoid participation in areas where their rankings are low (Anderman et al., 2002 ) .
In contrast, social groups or classrooms with a "learning" orientation lead children to concentrate on eff ort and improvement, emphasizing intra-individual comparisons in which children track their own past performance to mark progress. Participation in activities in which sustained practice results in obvious improvements, such as sports or the creative arts, is a concrete operational way to demonstrate to children that sustained eff ort has the power to lift their level of performance. Of course, highquality teaching or tutoring (which transmits eff ective strategies) as well as consistent practice are necessary if children's eff orts are to be eff ective in boosting their performance outcomes.
Conceptions of ability, perceived control, and coping
In late middle childhood or early adolescence (between the ages of 10 and 12), children come to understand the cognitively complex notion of ability (Nicholls, 1978 ) . "Ability" is an inferential concept; it represents an invisible capacity that can only be inferred from a pattern of performance outcomes: success on normatively hard tasks with little eff ort. To make such inferences, children must be cognitively capable of understanding inverse compensatory relations between eff ort and ability (Miller, 1985 ; Nicholls, 1984 ) . is means children understand that to produce the same outcome, smart children do not need to try as hard. With this cognitive advance, however, comes the vulnerability described as "the double-edged sword of eff ort" (Covington & Omelich, 1979 ) , in which children come to see that high exertion that ends in failure can imply low ability, thus making all-out eff ort a potentially risky proposition. At this age, the aspects of perceived control that best predict engagement (and that are best predicted by performance) change from those focused on the capacity to exert eff ort to those focused on one's own level of ability .
In early studies of the development of learned helplessness, researchers hypothesized that young children, because they did not have the cognitive capacity to infer ability, would be shielded from the eff ects of non-contingency, and that all children, once they acquired "mature" conceptions of ability during early adolescence, would be more vulnerable to helplessness. However, both these hypotheses turned out to be incorrect. For younger children, research shows that there is no age at which they are free from the eff ects of repeated failure (Burhans & Dweck, 1995 ) . Instead, the experiences that produce helplessness are diff erent for younger children. In early elementary school, more concrete tasks and more directly observable outcomes exacerbate the eff ects of repeated failure (e.g., Boggiano et al., 1993 ) . Moreover, although young children are not able to make complex inferences about the relations of patterns of outcomes to levels of ability, they can construct conceptions of their traits (e.g., goodness and badness) as fi xed and immutable (Dweck, 1999 ) . ese are the experiences and belief systems that make young children more vulnerable to helplessness. For older children and young adolescents, it turns out that the eff ects of cognitive advances on control and coping depend completely on the social context, both local and cultural. When children acquire the cognitive capacity to understand inverse compensatory relations among causes, they will apply these schema to eff ort and ability only in cultures (such as the United States) that endorse conceptions of ability as a fi xed entity that can be diagnosed from levels of performance (Nicholls, 1984 ; Rosenholtz & Simpson, 1984 ) . Moreover, these cultural conceptions must be communicated to children, for example, by teachers who respond to children's failures by doubting their capacities (Graham, 1990 ) . Finally, these messages must be internalized by children, so that they are convinced that their own ability is a fi xed immutable entity that is demonstrated by every performance (Dweck, 1999 ) . In contrast, if children operate in classrooms and cultures that allow them to continue to see ability or competence as a fl exible, incremental attribute, open to cultivation through eff ort and practice, young adolescents (despite cognitive advances) will maintain a high sense of control and high levels of eff ort and engagement in the face of obstacles and setbacks (Mueller & Dweck, 1998 ) .
Adulthood and aging
Work during adulthood and old age has not been able to identify specifi c age-graded changes in perceived control (Aldwin, 2007 ; Baltes & Baltes, 1986 ; Lachman & Prenda-Firth, 2004 ; Wolinsky et., 2003 ; Zarit, Pearlin, & Schaie, 2003 ) . However, lifespan theories have suggested that a general shift from primary to secondary control takes place across later life (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995 ) . In this context, primary control refers to reliance on prototypical control strategies, such as eff ort and instrumental action, aimed at bringing the external world in line with one's own preferences, whereas secondary control refers to eff ort that "targets the self and attempts to achieve changes directly within the individual" (1995, p. 285) .
e basic idea is that, due to societal constraints and biological declines, people are not as able to exercise primary control as they age, so they come to rely more and more on secondary control. Two main kinds of secondary control can be distinguished. e fi rst refers to secondary control as a backup system: After initial attempts have failed, people can shift resources from other endeavors to the implementation of the blocked goal ( ompson et al., 1998) . is kind of control, sometimes referred to as compensatory secondary control, includes processes like increased eff orts or the construction of new strategies. Especially important during aging, secondary control increasingly involves having access to the resources of others (such as doctors or one's adult children) through "proxy" control (Bandura, 1997 ; Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990 ; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995 ) .
e second kind of secondary control refers to a hierarchy of outcomes. From this perspective, when it is no longer possible to "fi x" the primary outcome of choice, people can shift their focus toward "secondary" targets that are more amenable to control. For example, in the face of a chronic medical condition, elderly people can shift their focus from fi nding a cure to having an impact on the daily symptoms or treatment of the condition, and minimizing its eff ects on others ( ompson et al., 1993 ) . is kind of secondary control can also include attempts to infl uence one's own internal states (such as emotional reactions or attitudes) (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995 ) ; these are also studied as emotion regulation (Gross, 1998 ) .
Many of these "secondary control strategies" have already been studied in research on coping, which is the more common term used to describe how people deal with losses, failures, and diffi culties that threaten control (Folkman, 1984 ; Lockenhoff & Carstensen, 2003 ) . Both coping and secondary control can serve to create control experiences even in "low control" circumstances ( ompson et al., 1993 ) . In fact, people's ingenuity in fi nding secondary outcomes they can infl uence, even in "uncontrollable circumstances," has compelled researchers to rename such real-life situations as "low control" circumstances. Outside of the laboratory, researchers have not been able to identify any situations in which people cannot fi nd something of value to infl uence. Hence, it is possible that these ways of coping, or secondary control strategies, are elaborated and consolidated as people age, perhaps resulting in increased confi dence in one's capacity to enact them (also called coping self-effi cacy), despite normative declines in primary control.
Coping as a Process that Shapes the Development of Perceived Control and Competence
e third and fi nal goal of this chapter is to highlight the reciprocal dynamics that exist between control and coping. If coping describes how people  ,  1 deal with ongoing challenges, diffi culties, and failures, then it becomes clear that coping transactions are an important form of control experiences. at is, the ways in which people actually approach and engage with real-life stressors, how they cope, is the grist from which perceptions of control are shaped. All of the basic elements of the coping process can be found in theories about the construction of control, namely, the actual stressor and its objective controllability, the individual's personal resources (including previous perceived control and actual competence), and the participation of social contexts (e.g., the availability and responsiveness of social partners). Hence, one important resource that can be infl uenced by coping is an individual's sense of control, with adaptive coping promoting confi dence, perceived competence, and a focus on mastery, and maladaptive coping contributing to helplessness.
Failure experiences and perceived control
One situation in which coping can have a decisive eff ect on a sense of control is when individuals are dealing with objectively uncontrollable events and losses. As mentioned previously, the notion of secondary control has been useful in understanding how people can deal adaptively with situations where primary control is not working, and has helped explain how people, when they do succumb to experiences of non-contingency and loss, can navigate their way back from helplessness. Controlrelated conceptions of secondary control focus on strategies that increase eff ort and concentration, access supplementary social resources, and locate sub-goals where control can be eff ectively enacted. ese coping strategies create a feedback loop back toward a sense of renewed effi cacy and control.
Equally important in dealing with uncontrollable events and failures are coping appraisals . Decades of research on causal attributions and explanations have demonstrated that, although unsuccessful attempts to produce a desired or prevent an undesired outcome are a risk factor for becoming helpless, it is the interpretation of the experience that mediates its eff ects on subsequent control expectations (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978 ; Weiner, 2005 ) . Work on control paints a clear picture of the kinds of appraisals that support adaptation in the face of failures, as well as the important roles played by social partners in shaping those appraisals.
Although some theories emphasize the importance of attributions of failure to unstable and controllable causes (most notably lack of eff ort), the overarching mindset that seems to promote a sense of control is the conviction that all transactions contain important information about how to produce outcomes, that is, how to exert control. Failures and mistakes can be "our friends" in that they tell us what isn't working "yet." ey can imply that more eff ort, time, or concentration is needed, that diff erent actions or better strategies are required, and that the task is harder than expected (Dweck, 1999 ) . Interestingly enough, such a mindset even allows people to discover more quickly that tasks are objectively unsolvable and so to stop working on them sooner (Janoff -Bulman & Brickman, 1982 ) .
It turns out that social factors are critical to the development of this mindset. Parents, teachers, and friends who view mistakes and "failures," not as embarrassing and shameful events to be hidden, but as fascinating learning opportunities will invite children to see them the same way (Dweck & Molden, 2005 ) . Although studied most often during childhood and in the academic domain, there is no reason to think that the same principles would not apply at other points in the lifespan and in other arenas. For example, during old age, when elderly people make mistakes or can no longer perform at previous levels, it is easy for them and their social partners to see these "failures" as signs of irreversible losses of aging. Alternatively, they can be viewed as temporary setbacks that can be worked around or compensated for by various coping strategies, such as increased practice, external aids, or social supports. is mindset facilitates the types of coping that maintain a sense of control late into old age.
Beyond control in processes of coping and resilience
At the same time, the picture painted in the control area is incomplete. Recovery from setbacks, losses, and helplessness can be conceived more broadly as issues of resilience, and there can be no question that true resilience relies on other adaptive processes in addition to control (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002 ) . e analyses of coping families can immediately suggest two additional fundamental processes by which coping contributes to resilience: one organized around relatedness and one around autonomy (Baumeister & Leary, 1995 ; Connell & Wellborn, 1989; Deci & Ryan, 1985 ; Skinner & Wellborn, 1994 ) . e primary ways of coping that follow from relatedness are part of the family of seeking social support (see Table 3 .1 ). 1 Support-seeking seems to be a general all-purpose strategy that is extremely common at every age (Skinner et al., 2003 ; Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2009 ) . It can include contacts that directly support control -for example, asking for advice about eff ective strategies or requesting direct help. However, support-seeking adds value to resilience beyond its instrumental potential. Processes of relatedness can add perspective to issues of control (e.g., "I love you whether or not you get that outcome"), failure (e.g., "You did everything you could"), and disappointment ("Well, we still have each other, so it's really not so bad"). And when it really is so bad, such as dealing with the death of a loved one, the presence and support of caring others can provide comfort, distraction, and healing, even when there is nothing to be done (Stroebe et al., 1996 ) . e adaptive function of autonomy is to coordinate preferences with available options, and the adap tive families of coping organized around autonomy are negotiation and accommodation (see Table 3 .1 ). Negotiation , of course, refers to attempts to locate or create desirable options, and so clears the way for control eff orts aimed at securing those options. However, in the control area, much more interest has been focused on processes of accommodation , which allow people to actually adjust their preferences to fi t within existing constraints (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990 ) . Once considered part of secondary control, researchers now view it as a distinguishable set of processes that involve fi t, "going with the fl ow," willing acceptance, acquiescence, adjustment, and "getting into it" (Morling & Evered, 2006 Rothbaum et al., 1983; Skinner, 2007 ) . As opposed to control-related processes of secondary control, which involve adding instrumental resources or changing the self to be more eff ective, accommodation has nothing to do with control: it is about letting go of desired outcomes and previously held goals (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002 ; Skinner, 2007 ) . Researchers emphasize that accommodation can be adaptive when primary control is not available. However, it can also be used as a fi rst line of defense, with primary control engaged only if accommodation proves impossible. In many cases, accommodation can replace primary control all together from the outset, for example, in situations where people feel that pursuing control (even successfully) would use too many resources, upset relationships, or interfere with other more important commitments.
e opposite of accommodation is not control, it is "rigid perseveration," in which an outcome is infl exibly pursued no matter what the cost (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990 ) . No complete analysis has been made of the processes that defuse rigid persever ation and allow accommodation to occur when coping with stressful life events (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002 ) . However, it is likely that strategies will include cognitive restructuring and focusing on the positive aspects of the current situation, making meaning and fi nding benefi ts in adversity, distrac tion with genuinely pleasurable alternative activities (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000 ; ompson, 1985 ) , and intentionally seeking downward social comparisons. Broadening the study of resilience to include not only strategies of control but also ways of coping organized around relatedness and autonomy will provide a more complete picture of the processes needed to deal constructively with stress and adversity.
Implications for Research on the Development of Coping
e central implication of a developmental analysis of perceived control is that the study of coping as it develops can be organized around specifi c ages during which children's understanding of control undergoes qualitative shifts, likely based on underlying temperamental traits, as well as physiological, neurological, and cognitive developments and changes in the environmental challenges and supports available to children. ese shifts produce changes in the strategies individuals use to coordinate actions with contingencies in the environment and in the causal schema they use to predict and process causal experiences. Both of these changes shape the ways people cope, and so can be used to focus the developmental study of coping on specifi c age windows during which corresponding qualitative shifts in coping may be found.
Developmentally graded ways of coping
An analysis of age-graded changes in the means for exerting mastery and becoming helpless has important implications for the measurement of coping. First, assessments of coping should include developmentally appropriate markers of all four coping families organized around control (i.e., problemsolving, information-seeking, helplessness, and escape) at every age. Second, when studies seek to examine age diff erences or changes, they should be sure that assessments distinguish each of the means hypothesized to characterize coping at diff erent ages, for example, both behavioral and cognitive means of problem-solving and escape (ZimmerGembeck & Skinner, 2009 ) . is analysis also suggests that developmental studies should examine qualitative changes in coping as a supplement to the typical focus on quantitative changes. For example, an important empirical question would be whether one developmentally graded form of coping predicts the subsequent use of a diff erent, but functionally analogous, way of coping at later ages; and whether during transitions when both forms should be readily accessible, the two forms of coping are tightly coupled. Research could also examine whether developmentally-graded members of the same family become hierarchically organized as new forms are added, and could investigate the factors that determine which of the strategies from a person's repertoire will be deployed in a given transaction. For example, do children and youth fall back on earlier forms of coping as stress levels rise, and do they return to more mature forms as social supports increase? Such studies will add to our understanding of the "building blocks" of the area, namely, ways of coping -and should help to move dominant conceptualizations in the fi eld beyond an age-delimited focus on individual diff erences and toward a view of coping as an increasingly elaborated and fl exible repertoire of developmentally ordered responses.
Qualitative shifts in the understanding of control e development of perceived control includes the construction of increasingly complex schema for analyzing multiple causes of success and failure as well as increasingly veridical analyses of individuals' own roles in producing desired and preventing undesired outcomes. ese qualitative shifts represent progress toward more accurate prediction and analysis of causal experience. However, each transition also represents a potential turning point during which vulnerabilities can be introduced that will undermine subsequent confi dence, engagement, and coping. Future research can focus short-term longitudinal studies on these normative shifts as time windows that may be critical to the development of coping. Explanatory studies can locate normative shifts by focusing on the cognitive devel opments that likely underlie qualitative changes (Band & Weisz, 1990 ) . Such studies should incorporate important predictors of how the transition will be negotiated, including the individual's previous level of functioning and the nature of the demands in the current situation, especially their severity and objective controllability.
eories of control also highlight the importance of mapping the roles of social partners, especially caregivers, in shaping the development of coping.
ey are critical in helping children achieve normative developments in causal understanding without undercutting their initially high sense of effi cacy. At the same time, studies should include information from multiple levels of the social context, not only about immediate social partners who participate in coping transactions but also about the social climates and societal assumptions that frame these transactions. Pivotal in this regard are societal and individual mindsets about the nature of personal force, whether it is a stable immutable entity that is displayed by every performance or, instead, is a dynamic plastic capacity that can be improved through sustained eff ort and practice (Dweck, 1999 ) .
Studies can include key markers of how the developmental shift is progressing, such as individuals' appraisals and reappraisals of the transaction as well as the strategies that people are actually using to cope with real-life demands -the balance of constructive (e.g., problem-solving, informationseeking) and maladaptive (e.g., helplessness, escape) ways of coping, and the general reliance on immature, age-appropriate, or mature strategies. Research can also trace the emergence of new and adaptive ways of dealing with stress and follow their integration into an increasingly dependable yet fl exible repertoire of coping strategies. Critical in this regard would be the identifi cation of factors that allow people to maintain access to the most constructive ways of coping in their current repertoire.
Especially important to assess across these transitions would be the individual's sense of control and effi cacy, which can survive normative improvements in causal understanding only if children and youth (and adults) repeatedly experience transactions with the environment in which outcomes of value can be achieved through sustained eff ort. Such experiences require objective control conditions characterized by contingency, responsiveness, and manageable levels of diffi culty, which remain attuned to the person as he or she develops. ey also require judicious social support and the development of increasing levels of actual competence in the person. Such a view makes clear the interlocking dynamics of perceived control and coping, and how previous coping episodes are carried forward in individuals' own characteristics and in their social relationships. From this perspective, adaptive coping is the grist from which a sense of control is won just as control, strategy, and capacity beliefs permeate stress appraisals and coping responses. 
Conclusion
Both perceived control and coping have largely been conceptualized and studied as individual differences phenomena. We hope that by focusing on what is known about the development of perceived control, and highlighting its connections to coping, this chapter may contribute to progress in realizing a developmental agenda for the study of coping.
is agenda will conceive of coping as an organizational construct that has the potential to provide an integrative link across multiple levels -from the physiological processes of individual stress reactions to the sociocultural forces that determine the stressors societies allow into people's lives.
Note
1. Since the most detailed research on development has been conducted in the achievement domain, many of the fi ndings about age changes cannot yet be generalized to other domains of functioning during childhood (for example, peers, or physical or artistic endeavors) or during adulthood (for example, work, romantic relationships, or health). 
